84. Because you need educating. Political essay 4. Positive and Negative Freedom.

Following on from my previous post about Why politics Matters...

I'm going to talk about Freedom and equality; what exactly freedom is in practice (why we need rules to be free), and then using this as a sort of basis we'll talk about ensuring freedoms and entitlement in another post.

As for this post; it is about freedom and the difficulties of defining it.

Now you may be wondering why the fuck this is important.
Well hold on for some logic here folks

Isiah Berlin came up with the concept of two types of freedom; positive and negative; freedom to and freedom from.
While his concept is flawed in aspects it does make some valid points.

Essentially, we need rules to guarantee a better quality of freedom for all.
We give up certain rights to ensure others.
For example; the right to kill everyone is given up, so we in turn are safe.

We give up certain rights ot ensure that we have a basic level of human rights for all...
Almost like the European Bill of Human rights that most of the front running Tories want to tear up... oh shit.
'How can such people possibly get to power? you may ask.

This is what happens when you put the 'remove all external restrictions about removing human rights' stick in front of the 'I'm a rich white privileged asshole' power hungry Tory.
Slight bias opinion? Maybe.
But go check out the voting patterns of all the Tory leadership candidates.
Most of them have admitted at some point or another, to removing some, if not all, of the EUBR.

And all of this is happening, because Leave is dragging us out of the EU and possibly all our other European obligations (depending on how fucked international relations are afterwards).
Regardless, they will weaken powers when and where they can.


Anyway, read this for more.


  “Contrary to what Isaiah Berlin argues, no hard and fast distinction can be drawn between negative and positive freedom.” Discuss.

     Freedom is a concept that is at the basis of a large amount of political and philosophical debate, both in the past and the present. Despite these lively debates it is difficult to pin down exactly what freedom entails. Some would argue that freedom is the ability to do whatever one desires, (freedom as 'want satisfaction'), however this does not work in reality as it is possible to inflict upon another's 'freedom.' In an attempt describe the nature of freedom, Isaiah Berlin argues there are 'Two concepts of liberty;' 'Positive' and 'Negative' forms of freedom. However, there are those who criticise such a stark distinction between these forms of freedom. Some disagree with this duel distinction of liberty, such as Gerald MacCallum, whom argues that "there is but one concept of liberty"(Gaus 2000: 98); one of a three part structure. Other critics such as Gerald F. Gaus argue that it is important "not to overstate the differences between negative and positive liberty"(Gaus 2000: 98), and that the key factor is one of choice. In light of these critiques of Berlin's 'two concepts of liberty' some would argue that there is no clear distinction between negative and positive freedom. This statement has some truth to it, as the critics of Berlin show, however, as Gaus writes "although the distinction is not quite so stark as some have thought, it seems that Berlin has made a powerful case that the different interpretations of liberty are grounded on different, indeed competing, understandings of value, reason and human nature" (Gaus 2000: 98). To understand the extent of contrast between negative and positive freedom, it is important to examine both the arguments supporting Berlin's theory and the various criticism and alternate approaches to this contested concept of freedom.

   Berlin; whom uses liberty and freedom interchangeably, argues that the negative sense of freedom is "involved in the answer to the question 'What is the area within which the subject - a person or group of persons- is or should be left to do or to be, without interference by other persons?'"(Berlin 2002: 169). While on the other hand positive freedom is "involved in the answer to the question 'what, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather that that?'"(Berlin 2002: 169). In essence, Negative freedom is the freedom from external interference and Positive freedom is the freedom to act. Berlin acknowledges the fact these are different forms of freedom, however that "the answers to them may overlap" (Berlin 2002: 169). Negative liberty; the freedom from interference, describes the degree of interference on an individual by other individuals or institutions; "the wider the area of non-interference the wider [the individuals] freedom"(Berlin 2002: 170). Berlin points out however that there is need for some restriction on an individual's freedoms; "we must give up some of our liberty to preserve the rest" (Berlin 2002: 173). Negative liberty deals with the level of interface on freedom (for good reasons of bad), while on the other hand Positive liberty on the "the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master" (Berlin 2002: 178); the individual's ability to act in their own best interest. In addition Berlin argues that, to an extent, an individual can be "coerced for [their] own good, which [the individual] is too blind to see" (Berlin 2002: 180), as "this may, on occasion, be for [their] benefit; indeed it may enlarge the scope of [the individual's] liberty" (Berlin 2002: 180). In essence therefore positive liberty is the expansion of individual's liberty, regardless of others. It is in this characteristic that Berlin finds fault with the concept of positive liberty; "To an extent of a man's, or a people's, liberty to chose to live as he or they desire must be weighed against the claims of many other values, of which equality, or justice, or happiness, or security, or public order are perhaps the most obvious examples. For this reason, it cannot be unlimited" (Berlin 2002: 215). This is the distinction between positive and negative freedom; positive allows little room for other individual's liberty and other values. Negative liberty on the other hand is a more pluralistic 'ideal' as it recognises "the fact that human goals are many, not all of them commensurable, and in perpetual rivalry with one another" (Berlin 2002: 216). It is for these reasons that Berlin argues that not only are the two forms of freedom different, but that negative freedom is preferable to positive freedom, as it allows for a greater equality before the law for those being ruled over.

    Despite the arguments of Berlin, there are those that do not agree with this distinction between the two concepts of liberty. MacCallum states that the challenges to Berlin's view have nothing to do with a 'truer' freedom; a reference to Berlin's preference of negative freedom, but rather "that the distinction between them has never been made sufficiently clear" (MacCallum 1991: 100). He argues that the problem with this distinction is that, like in most instances, there is confusion over what exactly constitutes as 'freedom.' MacCallum suggests that only by measuring questions of 'freedom' against the conditions of freedom; the triadic formula, "taking the format x is (is not) free from y to do (not do, become, not become) z,' x ranges over agents, y ranges over such 'preventing conditions' as constraints, restrictions, interferences, and barriers and z ranges over actions or conditions of character or circumstance" (MacCallum 1991: 102), can a distinction of freedom be made. MacCallum concluded by writing that the "discussion of the freedom of agents can be fully intelligible and rationally assessed only after the specification of each term of this triadic relation has been made or at least understood...this single 'concept' of freedom puts us in a position to see the interesting and important ranges of issues separating philosophers who write about freedom in such different ways, and the ideologies that treat freedom so differently" (MacCallum 1991: 121). In the context of Berlin's 'two concepts of liberty' it is clear that MacCallum feels that it is not possible to make such a distinction between 'freedoms,' and that "the analysis and understandings of discussions of freedom should not, therefore, be expected to produce always a neat ordering of the discussion, but it will help further to delimit the alternatives of reasonable interpretation" (MacCallum 1991: 121).

   Berlin however disagrees with MacCallum, arguing that "a man struggling against his chains or a people against enslavement need not consciously aim at any definite further state. A man need not know how he will use his freedom; he just wants to remove the yoke" (Berlin cited in Gaus 2000: 95). This argument takes the focus away from the conditions and aims of an individual's freedom; the individual in question may not have any knowledge of potential freedom opportunities, and concentrates on the approach to the analysis of liberty; in doing so Berlin insists that the questions of positive liberty; 'who governs me?', and negative liberty; 'how much am I governed?' are still relevant. This further distinction has also been challenged. "Positive liberty tie[s] freedom very close to reason; a free person must be a person who acts according to reason rather than through impulse, superstition, or custom or out of ignorance. In contrast, what has been called pure negative liberty seems to understand freedom without and reference to what is rational for a person to do: it does not concern itself at all with why a person acts, only whether this act is obstructed" (Gaus 2000: 96). Drawing on the writings of John Stuart Mill, Gerald F. Gaus argues that this distinction between positive and negative liberty is flawed; there is more to 'negative' freedom than just the obstacles to choices. According to Gaus "A free act must in some sense be chosen. To act freely, one must be capable of choice, or be a chooser, and one must exercise that capacity...Free action, even in the negative sense of freedom, thus does, after all, presuppose the exercise of a capacity: the capacity for voluntary choice" (Gaus 2000: 96). Essentially this means that the concept of negative freedom cannot be fully understood by only taking into account external interference, as ultimately an individual has to make a choice before being restricted; "although negative freedom is by no means to be equated to autonomy, it does presuppose the exercise of a more modest capacity, autarchy, the capacity to choose" (Gaus 2000: 97). It in this context that the concept of negative freedom can be seen as 'self defeating', as it falls back on assumptions of the exercise of choice; as only "choosers can be denied political liberty" (Gaus 2000: 98), while at the same time criticising that same exercise in the positive conception of liberty.

   Despite these criticisms of Berlin's 'two concepts of liberty' it "seems that [he] has made out a powerful case that the different interpretations of liberty are grounded on different, indeed competing, understandings of value, reason, and human nature" (Gaus 2000: 98). It is with this idea of competing human nature in mind that Maria Dimova-Cookson argues a "new scheme of the relation between positive and negative freedom that is based both on a retrieval of T. H. Green's theory of freedom and some further reconstructions of his theory"  (Dimova-Cookson 2003: 508). The problem she identifies with the 'two concepts' is that the distinctions between the two have been difficult to maintain, and as such has lead to increasing criticism. It is argued that freedom can be split into a political sphere; negative and positive freedom, and a personal sphere; juristic and 'true' freedom, and although the two are similar there are key differences between the two. In the personal sphere juristic freedom is "the power to act according to preference" (Dimova-Cookson 2003: 513), whilst 'true' freedom is found in the "pursuit of self-perfection, in the pursuit of something that the individual believes to be truly good and that will bring [them] permanent satisfaction" (Dimova-Cookson 2003: 513). In essence, doing what you want one the one side, and doing what you should on the other; ordinary action and moral action; "While the pursuit of the moral good implies the intention to good for the others, the pursuit of the ordinary good does not imply such an intention" (Dimova-Cookson 2003: 513). It is clear in this context the Berlin prefers the ordinary/juristic freedom, whilst Green the moral/'true' freedom. Dimova-Cookson on the other hand argues that while there is a clear distinction between the two, "one's moral good translates to another's ordinary good" (Dimova-Cookson 2003: 516), It is this difference in perspective that she argues is the key distinction between Negative and Positive freedom in the political sphere as well; "In the case of positive freedom, the agent exercises his freedom in his 'capacity' as a producer of moral goods; in the case of negative freedom, the agent is a 'recipient' of such goods. As there necessarily two sides to each moral interaction - productive and recipient counterparts - political freedom has its two aspects - positive and negative" (Dimova-Cookson 2003: 524).

  It would seem that Berlin's 'two concepts of liberty' are inherently flawed. The many critics of the concepts of Positive and Negative freedom have pointed out its various shortcomings; The lack of specific terms regarding  the extent of freedom as seen through the use of the triadic analysis formula, and the idea that all negative liberty is self defeating based on the assumption of choice in all forms of freedom. Despite this it would seem the Berlin's distinction between the two has merit, and when explored in more depth through the personal and political spheres it would seem that the "same social circumstances that make the exercise of positive freedom imperative...make the demand for negative freedom legitimate" (Dimova-Cookson 2003: 528). This may not be the distinction at the heart of Berlin's argument in 'two concepts of liberty,' but it would seem that while both concepts of liberty are intertwined, the "defence of positive freedom, can strengthen the grounds for defending negative freedom" (Dimova-Cookson 2003: 528). As such a clear distinction can be made between the two; a distinction of perspective.

Bibliography.

·         Berlin, Isaiah (2002). Liberty. New York: Oxford University Press.

·         Dimova-Cookson, Maria (2003). 'A new scheme of positive and negative freedom: reconstructing T. H. Green on Freedom', Political Theory, 31: 508, pp. 508 - 532.

·         Gaus, Gerald F (2000). Political Concepts and Political Theories. Oxford: West View Press.

·         MacCallum, Gerald C (1991). 'Negative and Positive Freedom,' in D Miller (ed.), Liberty. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 100 - 122.