Following on from my previous post about Why politics Matters...
I'm going to talk about Freedom and equality; what exactly freedom is in practice (why we need rules to be free), and then using this as a sort of basis we'll talk about ensuring freedoms and entitlement in another post.
As for this post; it is about freedom and the difficulties of defining it.
Now you may be wondering why the fuck this is important.
Well hold on for some logic here folks
Isiah Berlin came up with the concept of two types of freedom; positive and negative; freedom to and freedom from.
While his concept is flawed in aspects it does make some valid points.
Essentially, we need rules to guarantee a better quality of freedom for all.
We give up certain rights to ensure others.
For example; the right to kill everyone is given up, so we in turn are safe.
We give up certain rights ot ensure that we have a basic level of human rights for all...
Almost like the European Bill of Human rights that most of the front running Tories want to tear up... oh shit.
'How can such people possibly get to power? you may ask.
This is what happens when you put the 'remove all external restrictions about removing human rights' stick in front of the 'I'm a rich white privileged asshole' power hungry Tory.
Slight bias opinion? Maybe.
But go check out the voting patterns of all the Tory leadership candidates.
Most of them have admitted at some point or another, to removing some, if not all, of the EUBR.
And all of this is happening, because Leave is dragging us out of the EU and possibly all our other European obligations (depending on how fucked international relations are afterwards).
Regardless, they will weaken powers when and where they can.
Anyway, read this for more.
“Contrary to what Isaiah Berlin argues, no hard and fast distinction can be drawn between negative and positive freedom.” Discuss.
I'm going to talk about Freedom and equality; what exactly freedom is in practice (why we need rules to be free), and then using this as a sort of basis we'll talk about ensuring freedoms and entitlement in another post.
As for this post; it is about freedom and the difficulties of defining it.
Now you may be wondering why the fuck this is important.
Well hold on for some logic here folks
Isiah Berlin came up with the concept of two types of freedom; positive and negative; freedom to and freedom from.
While his concept is flawed in aspects it does make some valid points.
Essentially, we need rules to guarantee a better quality of freedom for all.
We give up certain rights to ensure others.
For example; the right to kill everyone is given up, so we in turn are safe.
We give up certain rights ot ensure that we have a basic level of human rights for all...
Almost like the European Bill of Human rights that most of the front running Tories want to tear up... oh shit.
'How can such people possibly get to power? you may ask.
This is what happens when you put the 'remove all external restrictions about removing human rights' stick in front of the 'I'm a rich white privileged asshole' power hungry Tory.
Slight bias opinion? Maybe.
But go check out the voting patterns of all the Tory leadership candidates.
Most of them have admitted at some point or another, to removing some, if not all, of the EUBR.
And all of this is happening, because Leave is dragging us out of the EU and possibly all our other European obligations (depending on how fucked international relations are afterwards).
Regardless, they will weaken powers when and where they can.
Anyway, read this for more.
“Contrary to what Isaiah Berlin argues, no hard and fast distinction can be drawn between negative and positive freedom.” Discuss.
Freedom is a concept that is at the basis
of a large amount of political and philosophical debate, both in the past and
the present. Despite these lively debates it is difficult to pin down exactly
what freedom entails. Some would argue that freedom is the ability to do
whatever one desires, (freedom as 'want satisfaction'), however this does not
work in reality as it is possible to inflict upon another's 'freedom.' In an
attempt describe the nature of freedom, Isaiah Berlin argues there are 'Two concepts of
liberty;' 'Positive' and 'Negative' forms of freedom. However, there are those
who criticise such a stark distinction between these forms of freedom. Some
disagree with this duel distinction of liberty, such as Gerald MacCallum, whom
argues that "there is but one concept of liberty"(Gaus 2000: 98); one
of a three part structure. Other critics such as Gerald F. Gaus argue that it
is important "not to overstate the differences between negative and
positive liberty"(Gaus 2000: 98), and that the key factor is one of
choice. In light of these critiques of Berlin's
'two concepts of liberty' some would argue that there is no clear distinction
between negative and positive freedom. This statement has some truth to it, as
the critics of Berlin show, however, as Gaus writes "although the
distinction is not quite so stark as some have thought, it seems that Berlin
has made a powerful case that the different interpretations of liberty are
grounded on different, indeed competing, understandings of value, reason and
human nature" (Gaus 2000: 98). To understand the extent of contrast
between negative and positive freedom, it is important to examine both the
arguments supporting Berlin's
theory and the various criticism and alternate approaches to this contested
concept of freedom.
Berlin; whom uses liberty and freedom
interchangeably, argues that the negative sense of freedom is "involved in
the answer to the question 'What is the area within which the subject - a
person or group of persons- is or should be left to do or to be, without
interference by other persons?'"(Berlin 2002: 169). While on the other
hand positive freedom is "involved in the answer to the question 'what, or
who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do,
or be, this rather that that?'"(Berlin 2002: 169). In
essence, Negative freedom is the freedom from external interference and Positive
freedom is the freedom to act. Berlin acknowledges the fact these are different
forms of freedom, however that "the answers to them may overlap"
(Berlin 2002: 169). Negative liberty; the freedom from interference, describes
the degree of interference on an individual by other individuals or
institutions; "the wider the area of non-interference the wider [the
individuals] freedom"(Berlin 2002: 170). Berlin points out however that
there is need for some restriction on an individual's freedoms; "we must give
up some of our liberty to preserve the rest" (Berlin 2002: 173). Negative
liberty deals with the level of interface on freedom (for good reasons of bad),
while on the other hand Positive liberty on the "the wish on the part of
the individual to be his own master" (Berlin 2002: 178); the individual's
ability to act in their own best interest. In addition Berlin argues that, to
an extent, an individual can be "coerced for [their] own good, which [the
individual] is too blind to see" (Berlin 2002: 180), as "this may, on
occasion, be for [their] benefit; indeed it may enlarge the scope of [the
individual's] liberty" (Berlin 2002: 180). In essence therefore positive
liberty is the expansion of individual's liberty, regardless of others. It is
in this characteristic that Berlin finds fault with the concept of positive
liberty; "To an extent of a man's, or a people's, liberty to chose to live
as he or they desire must be weighed against the claims of many other values,
of which equality, or justice, or happiness, or security, or public order are
perhaps the most obvious examples. For this reason, it cannot be unlimited"
(Berlin 2002: 215). This is the distinction between positive and negative
freedom; positive allows little room for other individual's liberty and other
values. Negative liberty on the other hand is a more pluralistic 'ideal' as it
recognises "the fact that human goals are many, not all of them
commensurable, and in perpetual rivalry with one another" (Berlin 2002:
216). It is for these reasons that Berlin argues that not only are the two forms
of freedom different, but that negative freedom is preferable to positive
freedom, as it allows for a greater equality before the law for those being
ruled over.
Despite the arguments of Berlin, there are
those that do not agree with this distinction between the two concepts of
liberty. MacCallum states that the challenges to Berlin's view have nothing to
do with a 'truer' freedom; a reference to Berlin's preference of negative
freedom, but rather "that the distinction between them has never been made
sufficiently clear" (MacCallum 1991: 100). He argues that the problem with
this distinction is that, like in most instances, there is confusion over what
exactly constitutes as 'freedom.' MacCallum suggests that only by measuring
questions of 'freedom' against the conditions of freedom; the triadic formula, "taking
the format x is (is not) free from y to do (not do, become, not become) z,' x
ranges over agents, y ranges over such 'preventing conditions' as constraints,
restrictions, interferences, and barriers and z ranges over actions or
conditions of character or circumstance" (MacCallum 1991: 102), can a
distinction of freedom be made. MacCallum concluded by writing that the "discussion
of the freedom of agents can be fully intelligible and rationally assessed only
after the specification of each term of this triadic relation has been made or
at least understood...this single 'concept' of freedom puts us in a position to
see the interesting and important ranges of issues separating philosophers who
write about freedom in such different ways, and the ideologies that treat
freedom so differently" (MacCallum 1991: 121). In the context of Berlin's
'two concepts of liberty' it is clear that MacCallum feels that it is not
possible to make such a distinction between 'freedoms,' and that "the
analysis and understandings of discussions of freedom should not, therefore, be
expected to produce always a neat ordering of the discussion, but it will help
further to delimit the alternatives of reasonable interpretation"
(MacCallum 1991: 121).
Berlin however disagrees with MacCallum, arguing
that "a man struggling against his chains or a people against enslavement
need not consciously aim at any definite further state. A man need not know how
he will use his freedom; he just wants to remove the yoke" (Berlin cited
in Gaus 2000: 95). This argument takes the focus away from the conditions and
aims of an individual's freedom; the individual in question may not have any knowledge
of potential freedom opportunities, and concentrates on the approach to the
analysis of liberty; in doing so Berlin insists that the questions of positive
liberty; 'who governs me?', and negative liberty; 'how much am I governed?' are
still relevant. This further distinction has also been challenged.
"Positive liberty tie[s] freedom very close to reason; a free person must
be a person who acts according to reason rather than through impulse,
superstition, or custom or out of ignorance. In contrast, what has been called
pure negative liberty seems to understand freedom without and reference to what
is rational for a person to do: it does not concern itself at all with why a
person acts, only whether this act is obstructed" (Gaus 2000: 96). Drawing
on the writings of John Stuart Mill, Gerald F. Gaus argues that this
distinction between positive and negative liberty is flawed; there is more to
'negative' freedom than just the obstacles to choices. According to Gaus
"A free act must in some sense be chosen. To act freely, one must be
capable of choice, or be a chooser, and one must exercise that capacity...Free
action, even in the negative sense of freedom, thus does, after all, presuppose
the exercise of a capacity: the capacity for voluntary choice" (Gaus 2000:
96). Essentially this means that the concept of negative freedom cannot be
fully understood by only taking into account external interference, as
ultimately an individual has to make a choice before being restricted;
"although negative freedom is by no means to be equated to autonomy, it
does presuppose the exercise of a more modest capacity, autarchy, the capacity
to choose" (Gaus 2000: 97). It in this context that the concept of
negative freedom can be seen as 'self defeating', as it falls back on
assumptions of the exercise of choice; as only "choosers can be denied
political liberty" (Gaus 2000: 98), while at the same time criticising
that same exercise in the positive conception of liberty.
Despite these criticisms of Berlin's 'two
concepts of liberty' it "seems that [he] has made out a powerful case that
the different interpretations of liberty are grounded on different, indeed
competing, understandings of value, reason, and human nature" (Gaus 2000:
98). It is with this idea of competing human nature in mind that Maria
Dimova-Cookson argues a "new scheme of the relation between positive and
negative freedom that is based both on a retrieval of T. H. Green's theory of
freedom and some further reconstructions of his theory" (Dimova-Cookson 2003: 508). The problem she
identifies with the 'two concepts' is that the distinctions between the two
have been difficult to maintain, and as such has lead to increasing criticism.
It is argued that freedom can be split into a political sphere; negative and
positive freedom, and a personal sphere; juristic and 'true' freedom, and
although the two are similar there are key differences between the two. In the
personal sphere juristic freedom is "the power to act according to
preference" (Dimova-Cookson 2003: 513), whilst 'true' freedom is found in
the "pursuit of self-perfection, in the pursuit of something that the
individual believes to be truly good and that will bring [them] permanent
satisfaction" (Dimova-Cookson 2003: 513). In essence, doing what you want
one the one side, and doing what you should on the other; ordinary action and
moral action; "While the pursuit of the moral good implies the intention
to good for the others, the pursuit of the ordinary good does not imply such an
intention" (Dimova-Cookson 2003: 513). It is clear in this context the
Berlin prefers the ordinary/juristic freedom, whilst Green the moral/'true'
freedom. Dimova-Cookson on the other hand argues that while there is a clear
distinction between the two, "one's moral good translates to another's
ordinary good" (Dimova-Cookson 2003: 516), It is this difference in
perspective that she argues is the key distinction between Negative and
Positive freedom in the political sphere as well; "In the case of positive
freedom, the agent exercises his freedom in his 'capacity' as a producer of
moral goods; in the case of negative freedom, the agent is a 'recipient' of
such goods. As there necessarily two sides to each moral interaction -
productive and recipient counterparts - political freedom has its two aspects -
positive and negative" (Dimova-Cookson 2003: 524).
It would seem that Berlin's 'two concepts of
liberty' are inherently flawed. The many critics of the concepts of Positive
and Negative freedom have pointed out its various shortcomings; The lack of
specific terms regarding the extent of
freedom as seen through the use of the triadic analysis formula, and the idea
that all negative liberty is self defeating based on the assumption of choice
in all forms of freedom. Despite this it would seem the Berlin's distinction
between the two has merit, and when explored in more depth through the personal
and political spheres it would seem that the "same social circumstances
that make the exercise of positive freedom imperative...make the demand for
negative freedom legitimate" (Dimova-Cookson 2003: 528). This may not be
the distinction at the heart of Berlin's argument in 'two concepts of liberty,'
but it would seem that while both concepts of liberty are intertwined, the
"defence of positive freedom, can strengthen the grounds for defending
negative freedom" (Dimova-Cookson 2003: 528). As such a clear distinction
can be made between the two; a distinction of perspective.
Bibliography.
·
Berlin, Isaiah (2002). Liberty. New York: Oxford University
Press.
·
Dimova-Cookson, Maria (2003). 'A new
scheme of positive and negative freedom: reconstructing T. H. Green on
Freedom', Political Theory, 31: 508,
pp. 508 - 532.
·
Gaus, Gerald F (2000). Political Concepts and Political Theories.
Oxford: West View Press.
·
MacCallum, Gerald C (1991).
'Negative and Positive Freedom,' in D Miller (ed.), Liberty. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 100 - 122.
